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PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF NEW PROCEDURES
IN THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Ralph M. Patterson'
During the past several years there
has been in Michigan considerable interest manifested in the control of
criminal psychopaths. The attention of
the public was focused on the sexual
psychopaths in particular and an attempt was made to obtain more stringent control over these unfortunate
and dangerous individuals. These efforts were crystallized in 1937 by the
enactment of the "Goodrich Law."
However, since various features of this
act met with the disapproval of the
State Supreme Court, it was declared
unconstitutional. In no way daunted
by this frustration, the Michigan State
Legislature exerted itself to construct
a constitutionally secure law which
would provide rigid control over what
were called criminal sexual psychopathic persons. This zealous application
culminated in 1939 with the enactment
of "An act to define criminal sexual
psychopathic persons and to provide for
the commitment of such persons and
the procedure therefor."' This same
session also saw the passage of an act
which provides for a psychiatric examination of all individuals charged
with murder.' Since these two acts
promote striking changes in procedure,
it seems propitious to review at this

time the role of the psychiatrist in
court and to develop, if possible, a certain uniformity of attitude and approach.
When the criminal court first recognized the concept of mental illness
there was no need for psychiatric or
expert testimony to determine the
presence or absence of insanity. Any
ordinary person -was able to determine
responsibility or irresponsibility according to the principles defined by
Coke5 in 1671: "He that is non compos
mentis and totally deprived of all compassings and imaginations, cannot commit high treason * * but it must be
absolute madness, and total deprivation
of memory." It is apparent that this
narrow definition was strictly adhered
to during the next half-century, for one
finds the following re-statement during
the trial of Arnold 6: "It must be a man
that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory and does not
know what he is doing, no more than
an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast,
such a one is never the object of punishment." There is evidence .that the
court was beginning at this time to
entertain the philosophical concept of
the "knowledge of right or wrong" for
it was stated that a man was respon-

I Neuropsychiatric Institute, University Hospital. Ann Arbor, Michigan.
- No. 196. Public Acts of Mich.. 1937.
•No. 165, Public Acts of Mich.. 1939.

4No. 259, Public Acts of Mich., 1939.
5 Coke, Edw.: The Third Part of the Institutes
of the Laws of England. p. 6, 1671.
,;Howell. T. B.: State Trials. Trial of Arnold,
p. 766. 1724.

[684]

NEW PROCEDURES
sible: "wfo knew what he was doing,
The acquittal of McNaghton 9 in 1843
and was able to distinguish whether he on the grounds of partial, or as it was
was doing good or evil, and understood then popularly known, "delusional inwhat he did." Towards the end of the sanity," aroused considerable public
eighteenth century the court began to reaction. This prompted the House of
acknowledge the existence of what was Lords to put certain pertinent quescalled "partial insanity" but refused to tions to the judges and this august body
recognize this as a defense on the of fifteen men answered questions 2
grounds of insanity. To quote from and 3 in part as follows: "That to
Hale-: "They have a competent use of establish a defense on the grounds of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that
reason in respect to some subjects * *
and yet are not wholly destitute of the at the time of committing the act, the
use of reason: and thispartial insanity accused was laboring under such a deseems not to excuse them in the com- fect of reason from disease of the mind
mitting of any offense * * * . It is very as not to know the nature and quality
difficult to define the indivisible line of the act he was doing, or if he did
that divides perfect and'partial insanity know it that he did not know he was
* * * a total alienation of the mind, or
doing what was wrong." If the "opinperfect madness; this excuses from the ions of the judges" had been rendered
guilt of felony and treason." As the before the trial of McNaughton he
court became more and more inclined would probably never have been acto accept the defense of partial insanity quitted. In co2psequence of this unit became necessary to call upon expert precedented questioning by the House
witnesses so that by the beginning of of Lords, the criminal court entered an
the nineteenth century the psychia- era of relative inflexibility which pertrist, if we may call him such, was in- sists to date. The pleas of Prichard, 10
vited to testify before the criminal Ray," and others,1 2 all leading psychiacourt. The psychiatrist then, as now, trists of their time, went quite unnowas inclined to possess a somewhat dif- ticed. Ray was probably far in advance
ferent point of view than the court and of the period, for he remarked that the
one finds Benjamin Rush," the father right versus wrong test: "furnishes no
of American psychiatry, writing on protection to that class of the insane
"moral derangement" and of rescuing who entertain no specific delusion, but
certain individuals afflicted with this act from momentary irresistible imdisease from the arm of the law "to pulses, or diseased moral perceptions."
render them the subjects of the kind This introduction of the unscientific
concept: "irresistible impulse" in 1853
and lenient hand of medicine:"
7 Hale, Matthew: The History of the Pleas of
the Crown, p. 30, 1778.
8 Rush, Benjamin: Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind, p. 264.
Philadelphia, 1812.
9 Stephen, James Fitzjames: A History of the
Criminal Law in England. Vol. 2, p. 153 et seq.
1883.

1o Prichard, James Cowles: A Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders Affecting the Mind.
Philadelphia, 1837.
11Ray, I.: Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, pp. 38, 46, 61, 66. Boston, 1853.
12

Moral Insanity, Am. J. Insanity. 14:311, 1858.

RALPH M. PATTERSON
anticipated acquittals on this defense
by more than half a century. To quote
further from this outstanding scientist
of nearly a century ago: "It would be
far better if we had a class of men * * *
peculiarly fitted for duty by a course
of studies expressly directed to this end
* * * appointed by the government * * *
ready, at the call of the court, to examine the health of criminals, draw up
reports touching the same, and deliver
opinions."
He further recommends
that if the question of insanity should
arise the defendant ought to be placed
in a hospital for the insane for a period
of study and observation. These words
of wisdom fell on the ground made
sterile by the famous McNaughton
trial, for even now relatively few courts
and very few states permit the carrying out of such procedures. Another
voice in the wilderness, that of Falret"
likewise went unheeded. His remarks,
which are most interesting and might
have been made to-day rather than in
1867, were as follows: "Instead of fixing our principal attention upon the
act with which he is charged, and which
is submitted to our investigation, let
us abandon this narrow and excliisive
point of view, to consider the individual
as a whole, in his entire physical and
moral constitution, in his past, his present and his future. Let us make, in a
word, a medical examination as we
would in the case of a patient laboring
under any other form of disease. Let
us, then cease to waste words in dis-

passion and natural mental errors, from
morbid ideas and feelings of insanity.
Let us study, clinically, the whole body
of physical and moral phenomena
which the history and present condition
of our patient affords. Let us bring
together all who have any knowledge
of him, and trace back as far as possible into his past, even to his birth and
ancestry.

* * * Again, let us com-

pare the individual with himself in different periods of his life; with the mode
of thinking, the conduct, ideas, feelings
and acts common to men in the same
condition of life as his own. Let us
judge him by the criterion .of common
sense, and in the light of the prevailing
ideas, the manners and social customs
of his age, * * * for, in this standard

cussing the fluctuating and arbitrary
limits which theoretically divide sin.

of common sense, with the numerous
variations possible to it in individual
cases, lies the primary point of comparison for us, by which, in the last
analysis, we may decide between reason and insanity." Despite this and
other masterful pleas for abandonment
of the archaic punitive philosophy and
procedure -there was no observable
change until the very last decade of
the ninefeenth century 'Ransom, 1 4 a
physician at the New York State Prison
at Dannemora, had the temerity to
bring up again at that time the question of moral insanity and of "irresistible impulse." He also called attention to the fact that there were
what he termed "psychopathic criminals" who had to be approached and
treated in a fashion different from that
used for the ordinary criminal. He

-Falret. Jules: On Moral Insanity. Am. J.
Insanity. 23:407. 1867. pp. 420-421.

"4Ransom, Julius B.: The Physician and the
Criminal. J. A. M. A.. 27:788. 1896.
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was further supported by McDonald' 5
who insisted that responsibility, i.e.,
punishability, should rest on the existence or non-existence of mental disease. He emphasizes further that the
defendant in order to be responsible
must have sufficient mental capacity
to rationally appreciate the nature and
consequence of the act he is committing and have sufficient power of will
to enable him to choose between doing
it and not doing it. He elucidates
further that if the defendant is to be
considered irresponsible he must have
lost the power of choosing, with reference to the particular act, due to mental disease. The State of Michigan does
recognize the very questionable defense
of "irresistible impulse" but the rules
laid down by the judges following the
trial of McNaughton tend to dominate
the courts. Prior to 1939 the psychiatrist in a circuit court in Michigan was
subjected to the same form of focal
questioning and confusing hypothetical
questions as of the preceding fifty or
seventy-five years. No change could be
expected so long as the criminal law
remained punitive in purpose and the
only call for psychiatric testimony was
to aid in the determination of punishability.
Although defendants charged with
murder or criminal sexual psychopathy
will be treated differently, procedure
otherwise will continue to be based on
punitive English law. Whether outmoded or modern philosophies are followed, in either case certain questions

of psychiatric policy arise. Is it advisable or is it necessary for the psychiatrist to state whether the defendant
knew "right from wrong" or the "nature and quality of the act" or that he
was "responsible or irresponsible"?
East "' remarks that the weakness of
medical evidence in the criminal trial
is often due to the attempt of the psychiatrist to prove too much and confuse the difference between irresponsibility according to law and to medicine. In a medical sense this term refers to mental health whereas the legal
connotation is that of punishability.
East further emphasizes that the psychiatrist's report should be of such detail and clarity as to permit conclusions regarding the culpability of the
defendant. In this light he urges the
adoption of the term "culpable" and
assiduous avoidance of the presentations of any conclusions in regard to
the defendant's responsibility. He considers it quite unnecessary and, in fact,
unscientific for the psychiatrist to permit himself to become involved in any
discussion of the legal concept of
"knowledge of the nature and quality
of the act" or the question of "right
versus wrong." Overholser T supports
this viewpoint, insisting particularly
that the expert avoid making any conclusions regarding the responsibility of
the defendant. The legal profession and
the public accuse the psychiatrist of
extravagant claims, unreliability of
diagnosis, fantastic testimony, disagreements among themselves, etc., but the

15McDonald, Carlos F.: Am. J. Insanity.
56:21, 1899.
16East, W. S.: The Modern Psychiatric Approach to Crime. J. Ment. Sc. 85:649. 1939.

atry in the Criminal Law. Boston Univ. Law

7 Overholser,

Rev. 16:322. 1936.

Winifred: The Place of Psychi-
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attorneys in making such accusations
scientific merit. Undoubtedly, the act
seem rather blind to the nature and concerning sexual psychopaths was not
quality of the questions asked. As cor- intended as a recognition of scientific
rectly and wisely stated by Ray":
progress, but was, on the contrary, pro"Much of the unmerited distrust of ex- mulgated for the purpose of giving a
perts' testimony springs from the man- sexual offender who might otherwise
ner in which it is elicited." He also
get three to five years, indefinite or
offers a solution as follows: "This evil
lifelong incarceration. This is substanwould be entirely avoided if the testi- tiated by the provisions for discharge,
mony of experts would be given in
which latter cannot be accomplished
writing and read to the jury without
until the accused has fully and perany oral examination."
manently recovered. Whatever may be
Although the psychiatrist may feel
the purpose and intent of the law, it
inclined to criticize the present pro- represents a definite social and sciencedure, the legal profession cannot be
tific advancement. The act does possess
accused of apathy. On the contrary, certain regrettable features, the most
lawyers interested in criminal law are -important probably being the discremaking energetic efforts to eliminate tionary power given to the prosecuting
the punitive approach and thus improve attorney. He is not required to demand
trial procedure; permitting at the same a psychiatric examination of a person
time introduction of treatment methaccused of a sexual crime but may, if
ods. Beccle,' 9 for example, in a recent
he wishes to consider the accused a
article on Modern Medico-legal Trends possible criminal sexual psychopath,
discusses the question of sex offenses then request psychiatric examination.
and what to do with the offender. His There are, of course, possible advaninability to arrive at any satisfactory
tages to this freedom of action given
solution may perhaps be due to no to prosecutors but it permits considerfault of the legal profession but rather able variance in procedure throughout
to the failure of the psychiatrist to pro- the state and allows the subjective
vide the proper answer.
reactions of the prosecutor to influence
Cooperative effort has indeed pro- his course of conduct.
duced tangible results in the State of
For example, L. A. (Case No. 447604)
Michigan. By the passage of the aforerecently studied at The Neuropsychiatric Institute had been known to have
mentioned act concerning sex offensome homosexual leanings for many
ders, our state has the unique distincyears. He indulged in mutual masturtion of being the first to recognize any
bation in adolescence and continued this
relationship between culpability and
practice in early adult life until married at the age of twenty-three Folpsychopathic personality. Thus a medlowing the loss of his wife when he was
ical term has been admitted to the bar,
thirty-five, he continued to indulge in
even though the term is of questionable
similar practices on infrequent occaIS Ray. I.: Contributions to Mental Pathology.
Boston. 1873. p. 428.
- Beccle, L. F.: Some Modern Medico-legal

Trends. Med.-Leg. and Criminol. Rev. 6:261.
1938.
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sions. At the age of fifty-two he handled the genitalia of a youth of nineteen
and was charged with soliciting an act
of gross indecency. During the initial
hearing the defense introduced the
question of whether this was an act of
gross indecency or simply indecency.
Since this seemed to be a somewhat
debatable point, the prosecution then
decided to pursue the case as that of a
criminal sexual psychopath. It was alleged locally that this change of procedure was in fact a political maneuver,
the prosecution wishing to be as severe
as circumstances permitted.
Another feature of the act which
might be questioned is the commitment
of the criminal sexual psychopath to
the jurisdiction of the State Hospital
Commission.

Although this body has

at the present time one psychiatrist
.amongst its personnel, the commission
is essentially a lay body. This lay
organization then determines the hospital or correctional institution to which
the psychopath is to be sent and also
decides when and under what circumstances he may be paroled and when
he may be discharged as fully and
permanently recovered. It is question
able whether such a group can consistently practice sound scientific criminology and psychiatry and whether
such a group will be as receptive as
they should of the recommendations
presented to them by the superintendent of the hospital wherein the defendant is confined.
Approaching this subject from the
strictly psychiatric viewpoint, leaving
out for the moment public feeling, one
wonders why only the sexual psychopath should be considered as mentally
ill and thus less culpable or less
responsible in a legal sense for his

criminal act. Why should not other
psychopaths with criminal propensities,
such as the emotionally unstable, liars
and swindlers, etc., be given similar
consideration? Legal attitudes have
encompassed this concept for some time
as demonstrated by the article of
Jacobs "0' and other attorneys who have
likened criminality to insanity.
T. D. (Case No. 455591) illustrates
this point in question very clearly. As
an adolescent this man had considerable difficulty in adjusting to the home
situation and was considered in his
early youth as stubborn, rebellious and
irresponsible. Because of these diffities, he left home at the age of nineteen.
At twenty-two he was charged and
eventually sentenced for assault with
intent to rape. He left the reformatory
after some three years and was for a
brief .time an itinerant worker and then
joined the Army, hoping by means of a
uniform and an honorable discharge to
overcome his feeling of inadequacy.
During his Army service he was in the
"brig" a number of times for drunken
and disorderly conduct and for being
absent without leave. At the age of
thirty, some time after discharge, he
married and within a year after marriage demonstrated pathological emotional instability in the form of explosive angry outbursts. These outbursts,
characterized by fighting, threatening
with a dangerous weapon (shot-gun, revolver, knife, etc.) continued,-being frequently aggravated by alcoholism. The
number of arrests, fines, and jail sentences was substantially increased by
such difficulties as, transportation of
liquor, larceny, and disorderly conduct.
At the age of fifty-two he was charged
with incest and was finally committed
as a criminal sexual psychopath. In reviewing his adjustment over a period
of years, it is at once obvious that he
has been a dangerous individual, unquestionably psychopathic, and should
have been under some form of protective detention long before.
20 Jacobs. Charles M.: Why Crime and Insanity. Med.-Leg. J. 45:4. 1928.
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The criminal code of Germany as
revised in 19332" provides for such
detention but only after the accused
has served a sentence. This method of
dealing with such individuals constitutes a double jeopardy and was one
of the reasons for the condemning of
the Goodrich Law of 1937 as unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it does have the
advantage of providing a prolonged and
indeterminate detention of all dangerous individuals and is not limited
exclusively to sexual psychopaths as is
the act under consideration. Irrespective of the handicaps mentioned, the
present act is a definite forward step
and offers an avenue for social reform
of scientific character in the field of
criminology.
A century ago Cooper2 2 criticised the

testimony of the medical profession,
accusing the expert of wishing to
ramble through the whole life of the
defendant rather than limiting himself
to the particular question at hand. We
now have the opportunity of doing that
very thing, though not, it is hoped, in
a rambling fashion. The psychiatrist
now has the liberty of presenting a
complete case study, which may include
a careful consideration of the defendant's ancestry, social background, personal history, personality development,
even the psychodynamic factors concerned with the charge pending. The
psychiatrist is not only permitted to
present a full report of the defendant's
personality as a whole but he may also
21 Mannheim, Hermann: The German Prevention of Crime Act, 1933. J. Crim. Law and Criminol. 26:517. 1935.

make recommendations and offer a
prognosis. The presentation of the
defendant's past, present and future as
recommended by Falret in 1867 has
finally become an actuality. If the
reports are full and complete, couched
in simple understandable language,
presenting a practical and conservative
viewpoint, they should go far towards
enhancing the position of the psychiatrist in the criminal court. Although
the number of cases studied in The
Neuropsychiatric Institute has been as
yet limited in number, the cooperation
received from the courts has been very
gratifying and in only one instance has
it been necessary for a psychiatrist to
appear in court to testify. Since the
filing of a complete report eliminates
the need of a personal appearance in
most instances, the psychiatrist is not
faced with either the hypothetical
question or cross-questioning. Avoiding
thus those factors which lead to the
disfavor and discredit of the psychiatrist in the criminal court, it should not
be difficult to correct most if not all of
the accusations, both fair and unfair.
leveled at expert testimony.
If practical, conservative, complete
reports can convince the court of the
value of psychiatric examination the
liasion thus cultivated would promote
more progressive criminology in the
State of Michigan. The first step of
progress would be the fulfillment of
the recommendations of the American
Bar Association 3 which are as follows:
22Cooper, Thomas: Tracts on Medical Jurisprudence. Philadelphia, 1819.

2. Report of the 52nd Annual Meetln- of the
Am. Bar. Assoc. 1929. p. 56.
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"1. That there be available to every
criminal and juvenile court a psychiatric service to assist the court in the
disposition of offenders. 2. That no
criminal be sentenced for any felony in
any case in which the judge has any
discretion as to sentence until there
be filed as a part of the record a
psychiatric report. 3. That there be a
psychiatric service available to every
penal and correctional institution. 4.
That there be a psychiatric report on
every prisoner convicted of a felony
before he is released. 5. That there
be established in each state a complete
system of administrative transfer and
parole and that there be no decision
for or against any parole or any transfer from one institution to another
without a psychiatric report."

indeterminate scntence, perhaps to the
point of making the sentence wholly
indeterminate. Michigan 25 was the first
state to establish the indeterminate
sentence in 1860, ten years before such
procedure was recommended by the
Prison Congress. It is hoped Michigan
may again bear the torch of progress.
The concept of a treatment commission, treatment tribunal, or planning
commission is far from new, though
never placed in actual practice to the
extent of taking the sentencing power
away from the court. Bryce -6 recommended the appointment of such a
commission of experts as early as 1888,
suggesting that after examination and
study they prescribe the treatment and
determine the place for and duration
of detention. Allison voiced similar
views a decade later and during recent
years numerous references have been
made to such a treatment board. The

The second step would be fulfillment
of the recommendations of the National
Crime Commission, 24 namely that each
court have available not only psychia- American Law Institute 28 has been
tric service but psychologists and social active in developing an act which
investigators, the work of this tribunal would sentence youths under twentybeing furthered by the enactment of a one to such a commission, said youths
law similar in principle to the Briggs being outside the jurisdiction of the
Law of Massachusetts.
juvenile court. According to this plan
The momentum thus gained -would the commission would be composed of
permit eventually the achievement of an educator, sociologist, psychiatrist,
a third, more radical advancemkent, and criminologist, they in turn employspecifically a "treatment commission" ing other assistants or experts to aid
to whom the court would commit all them when necessary. Although there
defendants for observation, study, and is no theoretical reason for limiting
planning of correctional measures. such a plan to this age range, nevertheSuch -a program would require an less, the focusing of such a program on
extension of the elasticity of the present the youthful offender would doubtless
21 National Crime Commission Committee's
Report on the Medical Aspects of Crime.
- Lindholm, A. C.: Status of Parole Proceedings Am. Prison Assoc. 1938, p, 381.
26 Bryee, P.: Moral and Criminal Responsibil-

ity. Alienist and Neurologist. 9:428, 1888.
27 Allison, H. E.: What Constitutes an Insane
Criminal. Albany Medical Annals. 18:569, 1897.
28 American Law Institute: Criminal JusticeYouth. Unpublished communication.
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produce the quickest statistical and,
it is hoped, the most convincing results.
Under such a regime there would be
no need of separating more than a few
of the criminal sexual psychopaths
from other psychopaths and ordinary
criminals. Instead of following the
present trend of placing more criminals
under psychiatric supervision in mental hospitals, the trend would be to
place more psychiatrists in the field of
criminology. Such a course would be
more logical and more practical, though
perhaps not more economical if properly carried out.
Surenurry
Prior to the termination of the
eighteenth century the psychiatrist
played little or no role in the criminal
court. Since that time there has been
an increasing demand for expert testimony in keeping with the broadening
concept or irresponsibility. During the
past fifty years attempts have been
made to extend this concept to include
borderline mental conditions and "irresistible impulses." As a consequence
of this and the manner of questioning
psychiatric testimony acquired a most
unsavory reputation. The State of
Michigan has made a definite advancement in the field of criminology by
providing for psychiatric examination

of defendants charged with murder and
of individuals alleged to be criminal
sexual psychopaths. Although these
laws do possess certain handicaps they
offer the psychiatrist an opportunity to
present to the court a written case
study, i. e., a complete longitudinal
section report of the accused's past,
present and future. By presentation of
adequate, practical and conservative
case summaries the psychiatrist's reputation may be elevated and courts
convinced of the advantages of individualized criminology. By forsaking
the punitive approach the recommendations of the American Bar Association may be fulfilled. With further
progress, one might look forward to
the establishment of a "treatment
commission" composed of a social
investigator, psychologist, psychiatrist
and others as indicated. All offenders
would then be committed to this commission and corrective measures, preventive detention, hospitalization, parole
or probation would be under its
supervision. Confusing and contradictory expert testimony now so prevalent
would be largely eliminated from the
courts. The general trend would avoid
placing more criminals in psychiatric
hospitals but would place more psychiatrists in the field of criminology.

